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Carlos Closa 
Abstract 
Commission’s expectations on eventual compliance explain its different behaviour when dealing 
with Rule of Law (RoL) crises in Hungary and Poland. Whilst the Commission activated the first 
stage of the procedure of article 7 against Poland in December 2017, it resisted to launch the 
same procedure against the Hungarian government despite mounting criticism and demands 
from both academics and EU institutions. The Commission considers that compliance depends, 
on last instance, on the cooperation of domestic authorities. Accordingly, it prefers to engage 
with them in dialogue and persuasion rather than activating enforcement mechanisms.  If 
engagement strategies fail to obtain compliance, the Commission anticipates the consequence 
of activating article 7 enforcement: whether it can rely or not on Council support and the effects 
of not having it and it also anticipates negative consequences such as the future attitude of the 
affected member state vis-á-vis the EU. 
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On 20 December 2017, the Commission activated the preventive stage of Article 7 for 
the first time. Illiberal changes in Hungary (since 2011) and Poland (since 2015) had 
caused alarm, prompting calls for the activation of the mechanism from EU institutions 
(EP; 2017a and 2017b) and scholars alike (Editors CMLR; 2016:601; Pech and Scheppele; 
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2017a). While the Commission refrained from acting against Hungary, it did against the 
Polish government. The different outcomes in these two cases raises a crucial question: 
why has the Commission activated Article 7 against Poland? What explains the different 
treatment in relation to Hungary?  
Scholars have speculated with possible explanations for the Commission’s 
actions but they have not tested them systematically. This paper proposes a 
theoretically informed explanation, combining the Commission’s preference for 
compliance through engagement with its anticipation of the consequences of its own 
decisions. Firstly, when deciding how to enforce European Union (EU) law, the 
Commission considers the possibility of obtaining effective compliance without 
coercion. Given the EU’s reliance on the national authorities for compliance, the 
Commission always favours instruments that preserve its engagement with them. 
Failing to achieve the engagement of the offending government, Commission decisions’ 
on activating enforcement actions depend on the anticipation of their effects. On the 
one hand, the Commission anticipates the positions within the Council and the European 
Council in relation to procedures in article 7. Estimating that no Council majority or, even 
less so, European Council unanimity existed in support of its proposals, the Commission 
anticipated hypothetical negative effects of failing to obtain backing, such as reinforcing 
domestic offenders and/or erosion of its authority. On the other hand, the Commission 
also anticipates the possible negative domestic effects of a decision against an offending 
government: a sanctioning decision can backfire by provoking a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ 
effect. Whilst the later effect does not seem to play an important explanatory role, the 
combination of the preference for enforcement by engagement and the anticipation of 
effects because of lack of Council support hypotheses provides the most robust 
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explanation for Commission action. I first describe EU Commission actions in relation to 
the protection of the Rule of Law in its Member States and, the, I present the theoretical 
discussion of the various hypotheses. . I present next the evidence drawn from 
interviews with Commission officials and former Commissioners that support each of 
these hypotheses and then I discuss the theoretical implications of these findings. 
Finally, the conclusion restates the paper’s main theories. 
 
2. Commission performance on the protection of the rule of law 
 
The governments and parliamentary majorities of Hungary (since 2011) and Poland 
(since late 2015) have carried through legal changes whose cumulative effect is the 
reinforcement of the powers of the executive and the concomitant erosion of the 
principle of separation of powers. The Hungarian government has used its constitutional 
majority to reform the Constitution whilst the Polish government, lacking a similar 
majority, has implemented changes perceived as unconstitutional. These 
transformations have prompted concerns about the breach of rule of law value 
mentioned in article 2 of TEU. Puzzling, despite widespread perception of the similar 
systemic effect in both countries, Commission’s actions have differed. 
Thus, the Commission launched three successful infringement procedures in 2012 
with RoL significance against Hungary. The Cout of Justice of the EU (CJEU) upheld the 
Commission’s views in the three (concerning the independence of the data protection 
authority and the central bank, and changes to the compulsory retirement age for 
judges). notification In several other cases (regarding the concentration of the 
operational management of the courts, human resources, budget and the allocation of 
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cases into the hands of the president of a new National Judicial Office), the Commission 
only reached the stage of a formal letter of. In 2017, the Commission opened two 
additional infringement procedures concerning the Hungarian ‘anti-CEU’ legislation and 
foreign funding of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The Commission also 
warned that it remained resolved to use all available instruments while simultaneously 
calling for a broader political dialogue involving the Hungarian authorities. However, the 
Commission has so far failed to activate its own RoL Framework against Hungary, despite 
explicit European Parliament (EP) requests in 2015 (EP; 2015a and 2015b). Several 
commentators (e.g. Kochenov; 2016) have condemned the Commission’s failure to 
activate Article 7 against Hungary. 
 In contrast, the Commission has taken much firmer action against the Polish 
government. In January 2016 it activated the RoL Framework barely three months after 
the formation of a Law and Justice (PiS) government. The Commission escalated the 
various stages of the RoL Framework: having received no response from the Polish 
authorities to its January Opinion, it published a Recommendation on July 2016. The 
Polish authorities did not address the issues contained in the Recommendation and 
adopted a confrontational stance. The Commission issued another Complementary 
Recommendation that acknowledged that important issues remained unsolved while 
further concerns had emerged in the meantime. In July 2017, following the approval of 
four Polish laws reforming the judicial system, the Commission launched a first 
infringement procedure  and issued a third Recommendation within the Framework 
which explicitly threatened to activate Article 7. Finally, on 20 December 2017, the 
Commission approved a fourth Recommendation and initiated the first stage of the 
article 7 procedure. 
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 The huge scholarly criticism (Kelemen; 2017; Kochenov; 2016; Kochenov and 
Pech; 2016; Pech and Scheppele; 2017a&b; Scheppele; 2016) has targeted the limited 
enforcement actions (limited to infringement actions); the lack of Commission readiness 
to activate article 7 against Hungary and the slowness in Commission activation of the 
article against Poland. The Commission has officially justified its limited action appealing 
to the alternative enforcement via infringement action and the compliance obtained 
once the CJEU ruled on them and has officially argued that dialogue should happen 
before the Framework could evolve into the activation of article 7. The following section 
offers alternative theoretical explanations for Commission limited action and the 
activation of article 7. 
 
3. Explaining institutional action and inaction 
 
The predominant explanation for institutional inaction (Kelemen, 2016 Seldelmeier, 
2014 and 2017; Sargentino & Dimitrov; 2016) singles out EP group membership. Thus, 
members of the same EP group tolerate RoL backsliding if the offenders belong to the 
same group but will act against it if they belong to a different EP group (Van Hüllen and 
Börzel; 2013; Sedelmeier; 2014 & 2017; Kelemen; 2016). More generally, party politics 
would also explain the difference in the way the EU treats Hungary and Poland (Zalan; 
2015). Sedelmeier (2017) has convincingly tested the partisanship hypothesis using a 
sophisticated Qualitative Case Analysis for the EP where party politics and voting 
alignments are easily traceable in votes on resolutions condemning the specific policies 
of these governments. However, the effectiveness of the partisanship hypothesis for 
explaining Commission RoL actions remains untested.  
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The Commission’s independent status implies that acting on the bases of political 
affiliation can be perceived as a violation of its treaty obligations (Wilms; 2017: 66). We 
can thus assume prima facie that the Commission acts autonomously from national 
instructions and even ideological preferences. Moreover, Kassim et al (2013) have not 
found any evidence that ideology or more specifically party affiliation plays any role at 
all in explaining the Commission’s activity and these findings confirm previous research 
(Wonka; 2008). However, alternative evidence (Wille; 2013: 88-89) challenges this 
conclusion and substantiates the thesis that ideology (partisanship) could explain the 
Commission’s actions to a certain extent, to the point that Egeberg (2014) concludes 
that the European Commission today is […] probably more of a political body than a 
typical technocracy. Moreover, the Spitzenkandidaten process has further increased the 
Commission’s politicisation (Peterson; 2017). Translating the argument to RoL 
protection, Kelemen (2016: 226) argued that the Commission’s explicit refusal to 
activate its Framework against Hungary following explicit requests from the EP in 2015 
occurred for party political reasons: the European People´s Party (EPP)-dominated 
Juncker Commission refused to activate the Framework because only left-leaning parties 
backed the EP Resolution, while the EPP opposed it. Given conflicting evidence, I will 
test the partisanship thesis by constructing the following hypothesis. 
 
H1. Partisanship explains Commission behaviour. If the offending 
government belongs to the same party as the one dominating the 




An alternative explanation for Commission action states that it anticipates the effects of 
its decisions. If the Commission anticipates undesired consequences from its 
enforcement actions, it may refrain from acting. This calculation involves three different 
effects. First, the Commission might act based on the probability that decision-making 
bodies, mainly the Council (and, by extension, the European Council) will uphold its 
initiative. Then, the Commission’s calculation could also consider whether, even if it 
obtains Council support, the effects of the decision could either backfire, second, and/or 
not achieve actual compliance, third. 
In relation to the anticipation of Council’s support, Vitorino (2012) observed in 
general terms that the Commission is now forced to pay increasing heed to the guidelines 
and suggestions put forward by the European Council and Parliament and this intensifies 
in cases of co-legislation. However, Nugent and Rhinard (2016) found mixed evidence of 
the thesis that the Commission adopts a much more cautious approach because of the 
increase in intergovernmentalism during the crisis. Whilst these considerations apply 
generally to all EU decision-making, Article 7 constructs an even more pronounced 
decisional imbalance between the initiator (i.e. Commission) and the decision-maker 
(i.e. Council/European Council). The preventive procedure requires a 4/5ths qualified 
majority of the Council plus EP consent, whilst the corrective stage requires the 
European Council to act by unanimity. In a second step within the corrective stage, the 
Council may decide to adopt sanctions by qualified majority (although the 4/5ths 
requirement of the preventive stage disappears.  
These high decisional thresholds create a genuine risk that the Council could 
overrule the Commission, in particular if unanimity is required (Kelemen; 2016: 230; 
Scheppele, 2016). The political damage could be considerable since a Council refusal 
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would amount to an endorsement of the illiberal course of the offending government 
(Wilms; 2017: 68; Editors CMLR 2016). Commission action would thus be expected if 
there were evidence that a significant and sufficient number of governments would be 
prepared to support its initiative. Alternatively, the Commission may refrain from action 
if it believes that the governments will not support its initiatives (Kochenov and Pech; 
2016: 1066). As Pech and Scheppele (2017b) have noted, Commission hesitation can 
create a kind of circularity: why would any national government signal its intent to 
support the Commission when there is no certainty the Commission may trigger Article 
7?. 
Authors have rightly noted the reluctance of national governments to act as 
controllers of each other’s behaviour. Thus, Wilms (2017: 65-66) reports that Member 
States have only rarely used the procedure for national governments to bring to justice 
a non-compliant Member State for violation of an obligation under the Treaties (Article 
259 Treaty on Functioning of the EU, TFEU). In relation to Article 7, expecting states to 
initiate such a procedure amounts to asking turkeys to vote for Thanksgiving (Grabbe; 
2014). I derive the following hypothesis to test against empirical evidence. 
 
H.2.1 The Commission anticipates support in the Council/European Council 
as a prerequisite for the activation of Article 7. 
 
The Commission may also decide calculating that the decision may either backfire or 
may not achieve compliance. Backfiring means that sanctions may increase domestic 
support for the offending government (the rally-round-the-flag effect). The literature on 
sanctions has identified that this rally-round-the-flag effect occurs whenever a threat of 
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sanctions arouses a nationalist response within the target government or population, 
undermining the effectiveness of the threat (Galtung, 1967). Research has shown that 
under certain conditions, sanctions trigger a rally-round-the-flag effect and support for 
authoritarian leaders (Lindsay, 1986; Grauvogel and von Soest; 2014), although as states 
become more politically open, the costs of leaders resisting sanctions increase (Allen; 
2008). Pervasive nationalism can further exacerbate the rally-round-the-flag effect since 
it inclines states and societies to endure considerable punishment rather than abandon 
what are viewed as the national interests (Pape; 1997).  
Observers have warned that rally-round-the-flag effects could emerge if the EU 
activates Article 7 (Schlipphak and Treib; 2016; Editors CMLR; 2016: 602) increasing, as 
a consequence, the support for those domestic actors that EU intervention is supposed 
to weaken (Schlipphak and Treib; 2016). Commission-led decisions can have a 
galvanising effect within the ‘indicted’ state and as a corollary, further alienate this 
Member State’s government and population from the European Union and its 
institutions (Bieber and Maiani; 2014; Wilms; 2017: 68).  
Opinions that the 1999 sanctions against Austria produced these kinds of 
unintended and undesired consequences (Ahtisaari et al; 2000; Merlingen et al; 2001; 
Oreja; 2011; Wilms; 2017: 70) adds credibility to this thesis relies that. Schlipphak and 
Treib; 2016) observe a similar effect in Hungary in relation to infringement procedures 
launched by the Commission. Despite the appeal of this thesis, the literature on the rally-
round-the-flag effect has assessed whether the expectations of enforcers on the effect’s 
emergence actually conditions their behaviour. Hypothetically, the fear that activating 
even soft sanctions against offending Member States could trigger a domestic reaction 
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against the EU could enter into the Commission’s calculations, determining whether to 
initiate sanctions. 
 
H2.2 The anticipation of possible unintended and unwanted effects in the 
form of increasing domestic support for rule of law offenders would affect 
the Commission’s decisions to activate article 7.  
 
Finally, the literature on compliance with EU norms (Börzel; 2001; Tallberg; 2002; Börzel 
et al; 2010; Conant; 2012; Falkner; 2013) has discussed whether Member States comply 
with these and has established a typology of mechanisms for achieving compliance, 
distinguishing voluntary and non-voluntary compliance. However, this literature has not 
looked into how expectations about compliance shape the behaviour of the actors to 
which states delegate power to secure compliance. Even if enforcement is possible, 
lawyers coincide in that Member States’ compliance with EU law is ultimately voluntary 
and the EU is, unlike many federal states, not even theoretically empowered to use 
coercion to enforce EU law against a recalcitrant Member State (Roland and Maiani; 
2014: 1060-1). The late arrival of sanctions to the EU system (the Maastricht Treaty 
introduced ‘monetary sanctions’ where the CJEU found a Member State to be in breach 
of compliance with a previous judgment) demonstrates the rooted belief in voluntary 
compliance. Commission performance in other policy areas illustrates its shyness to 
apply coercive enforcement mechanisms. Accordingly, after 2003, the Commission 
refrained from triggering the sanctioning mechanisms foreseen in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure under Article 126 TFEU, while simultaneously the number of Member States 
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found to be in breach of the excessive deficit prohibition had risen to 17 in 2013 (Roland 
and Maiani; 2014: 1066). 
 The Commission almost always attempts to resolve breaches of compliance 
through a structured dialogue with the Member State in question (Batory: 2016: 688) 
and uses enforcement mechanisms very carefully. Blauberger andKelemen (2017), who 
support the intensification of the use of infringement procedures for rule of law related 
offences, record that the Commission favours a selective application of the infringement 
procedure. This cautious or selective approach derives from Commission’s fear of 
damaging its own credibility: If a Member State defies the Commission or ignores a ruling 
by the CJEU, it undermines the community of law that underpins European integration 
(Grabbe; 2014: 46). As a result, Commission officials, aware of the fragility of the system, 
try to engage with the Member States and find solutions rather than seeking 
confrontation. The Commission prefers persuasion strategies (Checkel 2001; Tallberg 
2002; Hartlapp 2007; Börzel et al 2010) before Court action. Even when the Commission 
activates infringement procedures, it engages with the offending government and 
exercises its discretionary management of the various stages of the procedure 
(Mendrinou 1996, p. 12). The successive steps of the elongated infringement procedure 
seek to achieve ‘quiet accommodation with the member state’, with the Commission 
consistently emphasizing ‘the need to preserve the cooperative model of decision-
making […][invoking] [m]utual trust and confidence’ (Rawlings; 2000). Sedelmeier (2014: 
113) observed that the Commission’s implementation strategy relies on a combination 
of formal and informal, and coercive and problem-solving instruments, bundled together 
to maximize leverage, while Bátory (2016: 688) argues that the nature of the mix of tools 
varies from case to case, and from policy area to policy area, but legal formalism (… 
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conformity with the letter of the law), and a preference for consensual tools over coercive 
action are common features of the Commission’s strategy.. Legal formalism also means 
that the Commission prefers to base its actions on explicit legal bases and this leads to 
reliance on breaches of specific treaty provisions instead of the more undefined and 
legally undetermined Article 2. The Commission therefore prefers infringement 
procedures as the main instrument to obtain compliance since they combine clear legal 
competence to act with a flexible approach and combination of engagement and 
ultimate enforcement. The more punitive enforcement mechanisms (such as activation 
of Article 7) are perceived as the last resource since it alienates national governments 
which are ultimately the agents who must implement EU law and decisions nationally.  
This compliance dilemma informs Commission enforcement strategy, which 
makes negotiation the prime means of promoting compliance (Bieber and Maiani; 
2014). The same applies to enforcement of Article 7. Alternative mechanisms that avoid 
confrontation and enhance engagement with domestic authorities are preferred to 
sanctions if only because they guarantee compliance: ceasing illegal behaviour is a much 
clearer expression of promoting respect for the RoL than punishment (Wilms; 2017). 
This of course creates perverse effects, since creative and symbolic compliance can be 
successfully employed because it enables the Commission to disengage from conflicts it 
judges too costly and yet maintain credibility. The Commission may go along with and 
even applaud the outcome because it shares an interest with the offending member state 
in avoiding a compliance crisis, even though the intended change is not achieved on the 




H2.3 Anticipating compliance obstacles, the Commission prefers 
actionswhich secure the offenders’ engagement rather than activating 
article 7.  
 
4. Research design, methods and data 
 
This paper examines the EU Commission actions regarding the governments of 
Fidesz in Hungary (2010–2017) and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland (2015–2017), where 
it scrutinised these governments’ breaches of the RoL. The Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe and the EP itself documented clear violations of the RoL in both cases. 
The Commission has sought enforcement through four infringement procedures against 
Hungary but it has only activated Article 7 procedure against Poland (after previous 
activation of the Framework on the Rule of Law). The Commission also engaged in a 
number of dialogues and informal exchanges with both governments. The dependent 
variable adopts two dichotomous values (i.e. activation/no activation of article 7).  
To validate the hypotheses drawn from theory above, I have established observable 
implications for each. Observable implications are the facts and/or data to be found if a 
hypothesis were borne out. To confirm a hypothesis, the empirical evidence must match 
the expectations of its observable implications. 
 
Table 1 above here 
 
Empirical evidence originates from two sources. First, Commission documents, in 
particular speeches, declarations and press releases, provide information on 
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Commission actions. I have coded 43 documents directly related to breaches of the RoL 
that the Commission has issued between 2012 and 2017. These provide justification for 
its actions and the codification assigned codes deduced from the various hypotheses.  
Secondly, I have conducted nine interviews with key decision makers. Causal 
processes can be identified in some very specific instances of decision-making at the 
elite level, where a limited set of actors are involved in deliberations, decisions and 
actions regarding the political outcome. Policymaking on the RoL within the Commission 
involves such a limited group.  
Elite interviewing requires that the sample comprises the most important political 
actor who participated in the political events under study. This in turn requires reducing 
randomness and applying positional sampling: the researcher uses positional criteria to 
identify desirable respondents (the analysis specifies a set of positions or occupations) 
of the key elites at the focus of the study (Tansey; 2017). All the people interviewed are 
current or former officials from the Commission’s Directorate General (DG) on Justice 
and Consumers (previously, DG Justice, Freedom and Security and even before, DG 
Justice and Home Affairs), and higher Commission ranks. Given its small size, these 
comprise the group of Commission members directly involved with the RoL. The people 
interviewed include four former Commissioners (including a former Vice-President of 
the Commission and a former member of the 2000 Wise Men Group), two DGs and a 
Head of Unit, plus two members from the Commissioners’ cabinets.i I used semi-
structured interviews that I held in 2017 between Brussels, Florence, Luxembourg, 




Interviews, of course, have limitations as sources of evidence since interviewees may 
conceal motivations, preferences and interests. But if the aggregate of interviewees 
systematically conveys the same motivations, preferences and interests, then the 
assumption of certainty cannot simply be rejected unless dis-conforming or refuting 
evidence is provided. I have triangulate information against existing sources such as 
newspapers and online newsletters in order to confirm or eventually refute the internal 
validity of the evidence.  
 
 
5. Explaining Commission action/inaction 
 
 
5.1. Does partisanship explain Commission actions? 
 
Evidence does not support the partisanship hypothesis for explaining Commission 
actions. Although the Commission rarely votes (Paterson; 2017: 352), it takes decisions 
by simple majority. Examination of Commission party majorities during the two terms 
under scrutiny do not provide evidence of any clear partisan pattern. In the 2010–2014 
term (coinciding with Commission refusal to move beyond infringement procedures 
against the EPP-affiliated Hungarian government), the EPP did not dominate the 
Commission and in fact, the EPS and ALDE together (which supported the EP’s 
resolutions critical of Hungary) had 14 Commissioners against the EPP’s 13. In 2014–
2019 (with initiatives concerning both Hungary and Poland) the EPP dominated by one 
(i.e. 14 to 13, with an additional one from CRE). In both Commissions the Presidents 
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belonged to the EPP while the Commissioner in charge of the RoL portfolio belonged to 
the EPP in 2010–2014 (Reding) and the Socialisst and Democrats (S&D) in 2014–2019 
(Timmermans).  
Evidence of internal Commission cohesion also questions the partisanship 
hypothesis. Neither socialist nor liberal Commissioners appear to have taken a more 
sanguine line than the one set by their EPP affiliated colleagues. During the Barroso 
(EPP) Commission, Reding (EPP) led action in the justice field, seconded by Rehn 
(European Alliance of Liberal and Democrats, ALDE), who cut financial assistance 
because the erosion of central bank’s independence, and Kroes (ALDE), who acted 
against Hungarian media laws. During the Juncker Commission, Timmermans, Moedas 
(EPP) and Oettinger (EPP) joined Juncker (EPP) in loudly voicing their criticism of Orban’s 
measures against the Central European University.  
Commission meetings do not reveal any internal dissent. During the Juncker 
Commission, with a socialist (i.e. Timmermans) in charge, the College fully supported 
him in relation to Poland, with no dissenting vote or voice when he hinted at triggering 
Article 7 in December 2016 (Commission 2016), nor in December 2017 when it did. The 
only rupture of internal Commission cohesion emerged in relation to the Commission 
registration of an ECI on 24 November 2015 calling for the activation of a procedure 
against Hungary for breaches of the rule of law. The Commission took this decision in 
the absence of the Hungarian Commissioner Navracsics (Fidesz-EPP), who strongly 
objected. Juncker rebuked the complainant and reminded the Commissioner of his duty 
of neutrality, meaning that he could not represent his home country.ii  
Evidence robustly supports the absence of causal value for partisanship. None of 
the people interviewed reported that partisanship had played any role in deciding 
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Commission actions and several forcefully dismissed the suggestion that the different 
application of the RoL protection mechanisms to Hungary and Poland had anything to 
do with the partisan adscription of their respective governments. Former Commissioner 
Reding (22,23,24) even argued that she resisted partisan pressures from the EP and the 
Council, while Timmermans (2017) declared that the Commission is politically colour 
blind when it comes to the RoL. 
 
5.2. Commission anticipation of unintended and unwanted consequences 
 
Anticipation of the effects/consequences of decisions as the basis for the explanation of 
Commission action/inaction informs three different hypotheses, about possible support 
in the Council, about the domestic effects of imposing some measure against the 
offending country and about the calculation of enforcement probabilities. Former DG 
Jonathan Faull clearly identified anticipation of consequences as a general frame for 
understanding Commission action: 
 
when the Commission makes a proposal, […] it has to think about how 
it will land on the other side of the road […]. Will it work? And if it 
doesn’t, what other consequences? Sometimes the Commission 
decides “I’m going to do it anyway. I believe it’s right and this applies 
as much to fundamental rights as it does to banking regulation or 
product regulation”. It can be anything but it’s part of the 
consideration. How does it work in Parliament? How does it work in the 
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Council? And if it doesn’t, if it’s rejected, what does it means for us, the 
Commission? That is legitimate (Interview Faull 3:7) 
 
The next three subsections explore the anticipation of effects of actions hypotheses. 
 
A. Calculation of support in the Council 
 
Evidence shows conclusively that the calculation of support in the Council/European 
Council played an essential role in the Commission’s decision to trigger Article 7. Barroso 
had already warned in 2012 of the limitations of decision-making under Article 7 
(Barroso; 2012) and Reding (2013) later repeated that unanimity rendered the article 
unusable. This in Reding’s opinion justified finding an alternative Framework for the 
Commission to engage in political debate on its own initiative (Reding; 2014). The 
Commission justified its Framework, arguing that the thresholds for activating both 
mechanisms of Article 7 TEU are very high and underline the nature of these mechanisms 
as a last resort (Commission; 2014).  
The interviewees overwhelmingly argue that the calculation of eventual support 
in the Council conditions absolutely any decision to activate Article 7. The general 
perception was that national governments were unwilling to become involved in RoL 
issues (A; 40). Lack of certainty of a positive outcome (upholding the Commission’s 
recommendation) played a great role in Reding’s perceptions (2;15) but did for 
Timmermans. The Commission feared several negative consequences if it did not obtain 
support, involving the risk of reinforcing offending governments (F; 9) and creating the 
impression of impunity (Reding 20; C; 21, 23) but the preservation of Commission’s 
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authority and prestige also played a salient role in the anticipation of effects (Reding; 
21; C; 22, Almunia; 20). Reding (2013) summarised this later effect clearly: the worst 
result of a new RoL mechanism would be to leave the Commission institutionally 
damaged, and thus to eliminate the only institution currently generally accepted as 
being able to deal with a RoL crisis. In this sense, inaction serves to protect the 
Commission’s institutional position. 
Evidence of explicit national governments’ positions shows scarce appetite for a 
more active role for the Commission in scrutinising domestic compliance with the RoL. 
Several governments expressed doubts on the Commission Framework, arguing that it 
unduly extended EU competence. The United Kingdom (UK) government argued that a 
new RoL mechanism was not needed and it opined that the RoL procedure undermined 
the role of Member States in the Council (UK Government; 2014). The Bulgarian Deputy 
Prime Minister voiced reluctance about the RoL Framework arguing that states reject 
external EU interference and ceding more sovereignty.iii An opinion from the Council 
Legal Service echoed the same critical position on the perceived extension of the 
Commission’s powers. 
 More assertively, several governments clearly expressed their refusal to support 
the Commission if it activated Article 7. The Hungarian government loudly voiced its 
opposition to any kind of sanctions against Poland and other governments, such as 
Slovakia’s were also identified as potential allies for blocking any sanctions against 
Article 2 offenders (Oliver & Stefanelli; 2016: 1081). Once the Commission launched its 
Framework against Poland, the position of governments did not turn more favourable 
to the Commission’s ends. For instance, the UK government considered the matter the 
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internal affairs of Poland. Juncker revealed his frustration, arguing that some states 
refuse to use Article 7 and this de facto cancels Article 7 a priori.iv  
On this background, the Commission developed a central tool of its strategy: 
proactive action to build a majority in the Council. As former Commission Vice President 
Almunia noticed, it is unthinkable that this issue of Article 7 will be adopted without this 
previous preparation (Almunia 22, Hübner 18 & 20). Anticipating the negative effects 
mentioned above in the absence of Council support, Timmermans engineered a strategy 
for encouraging Council support. He invited the Council to debate Poland’s breaches of 
the RoL and its government’s defiant attitude. The Council meeting of 16 May 2017 
decisively removed previous objections to Commission competence to activate the RoL 
Framework (C 17) but it also recorded broad support for its actions (F 5; Z 4). 
Timmermans (2017) recorded Member States support and used it to strengthen the 
Commission’s stance against the Polish government.  
After this Council meeting and in the face of the unwillingness of the Polish 
government to yield to the Commission’s demands, several governments (such as 
Germany’s and Slovenia’s) started to voice their preparedness to support more assertive 
Commission action if needed. After a fresh signal of defiance from the Polish 
government in its response to the third Commission Recommendation under the RoL 
Framework, positive signals from governments gave the Commission cause to request 
the Council to discuss the Polish situation again in September 2017. The Council 
recorded the need for Poland and the Commission to engage in dialogue to find a 
solution (Timmermans; 2017). Both Council meetings implicitly upheld the Commission 
Framework, under which such dialogue should occur, dispelling previous reservations 
about its legality. More importantly, Macron and Merkel jointly pledged to back the 
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Commission if it triggered Article 7 against Poland.v This political backing created a 
suitable environment for triggering Article 7 (Hübner 5,6,15 and 21) and limited damage 
to the Commission should the procedure fail.  
 
B. Unintended and undesired consequences (rally-round-the-flag effect) in the 
Commission’s calculation  
 
The theoretical construction of the hypothesis on rally around the flag looks at 
domestic popular mobilization. Certainly, interviewees coincide in identifying support in 
Polish public opinion for the EU and possible Commission actions in general [I, F], while 
they do not convey the same impression about Hungary with Reding (28), arguing that 
Orban had skilfully exploited infringement procedures to his own advantage. Certainly, 
the interviewees mention backfiring effects (Almunia; 6; Z; 7; F; 33; Faull 11; C; 30) but 
none of the people interviewed accorded any causal value to the risk of provoking a 
domestic mobilization in support of the government. Rather, Commission officials fear 
as backfiring effects the risk that a confrontation on the RoL could generally pollute a 
state’s relations with the EU (A; 7 &35). Thus, the kind of unintended and undesired 
consequences that play in Commission’s calculations are the risk of creating and aloof 
and awkward partner. The Austrian precedent is mentioned in this sense (Timmermans; 








This hypothesis predicts that the Commission anticipates that engagement with national 
authorities rather than enforcement via article 7 secures better compliance.  One 
interviewee indicated the limits to the Commission’s enforcement capacities very 
bluntly: the Commission has limits to what it can do […] And we cannot change a 
government, we cannot change Mr Orban (A, 33). Timmermans clearly stated that the 
only ones who could determine the fate of the Polish nation are the Polish people. We 
cannot do that, none of us (Timmermans; 2017) while another interviewee argued that 
to interfere at such a level in domestic affairs would be possible if the EU were a federal 
state […] But we are not (F 13; also Tavares 11,17, 18).  
These limits set the contours of Commission action modelled on two pillars. First, 
the Commission prefers to tackle any RoL issues as specific breaches of EU law and thus 
to treat them by means of infringement procedures. This preference emerged very 
strongly in the interviews. The interviewees portrayed these domestic breaches firstly 
and foremost in relation to EU competences. In these cases, they would then feel 
legitimised and emboldened to initiate Commission action via infringement procedures 
(Reding; 3,4,6; C 3,4,5, 6, 11, 15; A 1, 51; F 10; Z; 10,11; Almunia 1; Tavares 4,6,26). The 
Commission regards infringement procedures as creating the opportunity to engage 
with the offending state (rather as a merely sanctioning procedure). As several 
interviewees expressed, a preference for the infringement procedure derives from the 
fact that the Commission can administer the procedure and engage national 
governments. Thus, Commission preference for infringements associates with efficiency 
of the procedure: infringement is the most effective manner […] we are not negotiating, 
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we are asking the Member State to change and if they do not change we go to the Court 
of Justice (C 13).  
The second pillar of the Commission strategy to tackle RoL breaches is precisely 
the preference for non-confrontational strategies based on engaging offending 
governments. The Commission has often expressed this preference. Thus, Barroso 
argued that the preservation of the RoL should be achieved by establishing dialogue with 
the Member State concerned to find solutions (Barroso; 2014). Reding argued that 
engaging and dialoguing was precisely the aim of the RoL mechanism, drawing 
inspiration from the way the Competition Law works. Because the sanctions only come 
after a long debate negotiation (Reding 12). Timmermans has also frequently endorsed 
the Commission’s preference for dialogue with the aim of finding solutions without 
necessarily punishing (Timmermans; 2014) (Timmermans; 2015a; Timmermans; 2017): 
Our aim is to solve these issues; our aim is not to accuse, to go into a polemic. Our aim is 
to solve the issues in a rational way based on our legal obligations (Timmermans; 2016a). 
.  
 The Commission has consistently explained the difference between Hungary and 
Poland in relation to the different disposition of the two governments to engage and 
dialogue. Timmermans justified differential treatment, referring precisely to the fact 
that the Hungarian authorities are prepared to talk to the Commission while the Polish 
ones are not: vi Poland and Hungary are different. Orbán and the Hungarian government 
have never refused a dialogue with us. A constructive dialogue (…) has stopped, for 
instance, decrease of the pension age for the judges. vii His judgement on the Polish case 
underlines the failures of the government to meet Commission’s countless warnings, 
requests for dialogues and demands for clarification. Thus, he regretted that despite 
24 
 
inviting the Polish to meet, […] they rejected these invitations limiting exchanges to 
formal letters. […] (Timmermans; 2017). Lacked of engagement opened the way to 
considering activating Article 7. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
The table below summarises the explanatory value that the findings grant to each 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 2 above here 
 
Evidence shows that the Commission anticipated the effects of its actions when deciding 
on the enforcement of RoL. The causal mechanism begins with the Commission’s 
preference for compliance through instruments that can actively engage offending 
governments rather than those which could lead to severe sanctions (i.e. second stage 
of Article 7). This is because, apart from a genuine belief in its role as ‘accompanying’ 
national governments in seeking compliance, the Commission is well aware that lacking 
real coercion mechanisms, compliance depends on the will of national authorities. A 
preference for engagement mechanisms also explains why the Commission privileges 
infringement procedures instead of activating Article 7. The Commission seeks to 
identify breaches of specific law (treaty or secondary legislation) in cases related to the 
RoL, rather than to interpret them as a general violation of the values of Article 2. But 
even when the Commission activates infringement procedures in RoL cases, it prefers to 
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administer enforcement politically, considering the Court stage and sanctions as the last 
resort. 
 In the absence of a legal basis to justify an infringement procedure, the 
Commission still prefers to pursue compliance by engaging in dialogue with the 
offending government. The RoL Framework in fact introduces this engagement 
mechanism into Article 7. Since engagement becomes a crucial compliance mechanism, 
the attitude of offending governments determines whether the Commission wants to 
advance to more severe enforcement mechanisms, i.e. activate Article 7. A lack of even 
symbolic commitment in the offending government to this engagement and dialogue 
strategy opens this option. However, enforcement does not follow automatically from 
the failure to engage if the Commission depends on another institution (i.e. the Council) 
to activate sanctioning mechanisms. The Commission anticipates both the support in 
the Council and the possible effects of any sanctioning action. Failing to obtain Council 
support can produce several very negative effects: implicit endorsement of the 
offending government, parallel disavowal of the Commission itself and consequently, 
the erosion of the enforcement procedure and the broader disengagement of the 
concerned state from the EU. Other effects, such as a possible negative domestic 
reaction (the rally-round-the-flag effect) do not appear to play an important role in 
Commission decisions on whether and how to act. Naturally, Commission´s reluctance 
to activate article 7 because of the perception of lack of Council´s support may be 
detrimental to the whole functioning and foundation of the EU legal order. A way of 
containing damage could be adopting more expedient decision-making procedures such 
as the reverse qualified majority that operates in the Excessive Deficit Procedure: the 
Council must adopt a Commission proposal unless governments reject it explicitly by 
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qualified majority. Even if this change requires treaty reform, article 7 enforcement 





The story behind Commission activation of Article 7 against the Polish 
government shows its preference for engagement strategies and its reluctance to use 
enforcement mechanisms. This story also shows the limits to the EU enforcement 
system: lacking last instance coercion, the Commission relies mainly on domestic 
cooperation and this can encourage governments to comply only symbolically or 
rhetorically (Bátory; 2016). Sanctions may play a role to obtain compliance in specific 
cases but its capacity to force systemic change remains untested. In any case, whether 
applying a more engaging or enforcing attitude, results seem fairly similar in both cases 
with a steady erosion of the separation of powers in favour of an increase of the powers 
of the executive. Whilst activation of article 7 against the Polish authorities shows some 
signs of engagement previously absent, whether it would suffice to reverse course 
remains questionable. 
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